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Abstract 
A heightened awareness of cybersecurity has led to a 
review of the procedures that ensure user accountability 
for actions performed on the computers of the Collider- 
Accelerator Department (C-AD) Control System. Control 
system consoles are shared by multiple users in control 
rooms throughout the C-AD complex. A significant 
challenge has been the establishment of procedures that 
securely control and monitor access to these shared 
consoles without impeding accelerator operations. This 
paper provides an overview of C-AD cybersecurity 
strategies with an emphasis on recent enhancements in 
user authentication and tracking methods. 
INTRODUCTION 
Cybersecurity has been a major area of concern for C- 
AD network and system administrators for many years. 
This paper describes how C-AD cybersecurity efforts 
have recently expanded in response to a new emphasis on 
the risks associated with unauthorized access to C-AD 
computers on site at Brookhaven National 
Laboratory(BNL). It focuses particularly on attempts to 
provide individual accountability for all actions taken at 
the Linux control system computers at C-AD. 
CYBERSECURITY REVIEW 
In order to ensure uninterrupted operation of the 
Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider(RH1C) and other C-AD 
programs, many measures have been put in place to 
protect the C-AD accelerator controls network from 
cybersecurity threats. Self auditing software is installed 
on computers in the controls network to detect 
unauthorized system changes. BNL's Information 
Technology Division (ITD) conducts network scans to 
uncover vulnerabilities in C-AD computers. Critical 
system log entries are stored locally and forwarded to ITD 
for redundant logging in central BNL cybersecurity logs. 
The controls network is separated from the general BNL 
network by a firewall with restrictive access rules. Two 
factor authentication using CryptoCard tokens is required 
in order to gain access to the accelerator controls network. 
ssh access to the controls network is logged. A web based 
viewing tool allows system administrators or control room 
operators to monitor the use of the ssh access gateways. 
The C-AD Set History System [l] maintains a history of 
all control system settings. The originating computer and 
username are recorded for all changes of accelerator 
equipment settings. 
In 2006, new attention was called to cybersecurity 
issues at BNL A Department of Energy(D0E) 
cybersecurity audit in September of 2006 focused on 
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cybersecurity threats associated with physical access to 
computers on site at BNL. During a labwide 
cybersecurity standdown, all BNL employees received 
updated cybersecurity training and reviewed the security 
of their personal computers. Employees were asked to 
ensure that their passwords complied with DOE password 
requirements and that their computers had locking screen 
savers that took effect after a short period of inactivity. 
The 2006 cybersecurity review represented a shft  in 
focus for the C-AD cybersecurity program. The risk from 
insider attacks has historically been considered low in C- 
AD'S research environment. Previous cybersecurity 
measures primarily focused on attacks from outside the 
controls network. While the perimeter defense continues 
to be important, new attention now has to be paid to the 
vulnerability to inside attacks. The focus on threats from 
the inside is not unique to DOE. In the Computer 
Security Institute's "2007 Computer Crime and Security 
Survey" [2], insider abuse was reported to be the most 
prevalent security problem. Insider abuse problems were 
reported more frequently than virus attacks. 
The cybersecurity measures reviewed in the October 
2006 cybersecurity standdown were intended to provide 
full individual accountability for all actions taken at BNL 
computers. Establishing individual accountability aids in 
both the detection and deterrence of insider abuses. [3] 
By following established cybersecurity standards, 
individual accountability can be achieved rather easily for 
desktop computers that are used in standard office 
situations. System logs provide a reliable record of who 
was using a computer at any given time. Many of the 
computers used for accelerator operation, however, 
present special cybersecurity problems. Individual 
accounts do not work well in accelerator control rooms. 
Many users share computer consoles in control rooms. 
They do not only share computer consoles, they share 
console login sessions. Active sessions must be handed 
off from user to user in order to effectively run an 
accelerator. 
Group accounts have historically been used to satisfy 
the operational needs of the control room settings at C- 
AD. A designated list of individuals was given access to 
the group account password. New login sessions at 
control room consoles had to be started by one of these 
individuals. -Once a group session was started, the 
console was available to any user in the control room. 
Locking screen savers were disabled so that users had 
easy access to the computer and the screen displays 
remained active and visible. This is extremely important 
for accelerator operations since many control room 
screens are used for comfort displays. Operators rarely 
interact with the computers that drive these displays but 
the displays must be visible at all times. This group 
account configuration satisfied operational needs but it 
did not provide individual accountability for actions taken 
at the control room consoles. 
CYBERSECURITY ENHANCEMENTS 
The existence of group accounts in the C-AD controls 
network was considered a cybersecurity risk. In January 
of 2007, C-AD staff and ITD staff examined ways to 
minimize the risks associated with the use of group 
accounts. Several new cybersecurity measures were put 
into place. 
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Figure 1 : Network Access Method for Group Accounts 
Network Access 
It was agreed that new restrictions would be placed on 
network access to group accounts. Direct network logins 
with group account are disallowed using Pluggable 
Authentication Modules for Linux (Linux-PAM) [4]. A 
control system user can only gain network access to a 
group account by first logging in with an individual 
account. The user may then 'switch user' to the group 
account with the su command. A two layer authentication 
is effectively required with user supplying both individual 
and group account credentials. The su operation, 
including originating individual account, is logged in 
local system logs and forwarded to central BNL 
cybersecurity logs. The hstory in these logs can then 
identify which individuals have gained access to the 
group account at any given time. The use of ssh instead 
of su for the 'switch user' operation is being considered. 
This has the advantage of easily preserving X window 
forwarding. We need to ensure that logging of the ssh 
operation is done in a way that reliably provides the 
identity of the originating user. 
It was also agreed that membership in a group account 
would be strictly managed. All individuals given the 
group account password are required to sign a log and 
agree to follow safe practices when using the group 
account. In addition, group accounts are limited to use 
on a designated list of computers in designated locations. 
The group account is not available on any other control 
system computers. Group account members must use their 
personal accounts for work outside the control room. 
Special restrictions may be applied in network firewalls to 
further restrict traffic from computers with group 
accounts. 
Monitoring and Controlling Console Access 
The actions defined above provide risk mitigation but 
they do not provide true individual accountability for 
users working at control room consoles with group 
accounts. Various measures were considered to monitor 
and control physical access to control room consoles. The 
use of card readers at control room entry points was 
considered. This ,was determined to be impractical for 
most C-AD control rooms. Card readers could only be 
practical in locations where access routes are limited and 
the area in question is used by a very limited number of 
people. When the number of individuals present in a 
control room at one time is large, the card reader record 
can not do a good job of identifying an individual 
responsible for an action taken at one of the control room 
consoles. 
The use of video cameras was also considered. 
Operators and others who spend much of their time in the 
control room raised strong objections. They viewed 
cameras as an invasion of privacy. It was also noted that 
in some circumstances the video record might have little 
value. Someone with malicious intent could conceal their 
identity or disable a camera before using the console. The 
use of card readers or video cameras would also require 
the installation and maintenance of significant new 
infrastructure at C-AD. 
Another alternative considered was the use of RFID 
tags. A user wearing an WID tag may become authorized 
based on proximity to the control room console. The 
WID solution offers the possibility of transferring 
console control from one user to another without the entry 
of a password. Commercial RFID systems are available 
that keep logs of individual access to the computers in the 
system. This option was rejected due to the fact that no 
commercial WID user authorization systems were found 
for Linux systems. We also recognized, however, that the 
system has a serious security vulnerability if password 
entry is not used along with the RFID tag. A misplaced 
RFID tag can provide easy anonymous access to the 
control system for anybody who finds the tag. 
ScreenLock 
The solution chosen to monitor and control access to C- 
AD Linux control room consoles was a software screen 
lock. The ScreenLock program, developed in house for 
Linux systems at C-AD, requires a user to pass an 
individual authentication layer to gain access to a group 
account session. Screedock is similar in function to a 
commercial product called TSL-PROTM, which is only 
available for Windows systems. In order to start a group 
account session at a Linux control room console, the user 
fiist performs an ordinary desktop login with group 
account username and password. Before the computer 
becomes available for use, the ScreenLock program 
prompts for a secondary login with individual username 
and password. Group account credentials will not be 
accepted by the ScreenLock program. Individual 
authentication with Screedock is accomplished using a 
library interface to Linux-PAM authentication modules. A 
record of the user authentication is logged in local system 
logs and forwarded to central BNL cybersecurity logs. 
Figure 2: ScreenLock at Group Account Console 
Once a group session is established at a control room 
console, control of the group session is transferred from 
one individual to another with ScreenLock When a user 
leaves a console, the screen can be manually locked. The 
next user of that console must enter his or her individual 
account username and password to gain access. The 
underlying group account session continues uninterrupted 
during this transfer. If the computer is left idle for a short 
period of time, the ScreenLock automatically takes effect 
and locks the computer. Note that the display continues to 
update while the ScreenLock is in effect. This is 
particularly important for control room screens that are 
used for comfort displays. 
The added layer of authentication required by 
ScreenLock is extra work for users but it is considered a 
preferred alternative to other measures such as cameras or 
card readers. We believe that it provides a higher level of 
individual accountability than these other approaches. 
The primary weakness of the ScreenLock approach is its 
reliance on user compliance. User compliance is essential 
in order to achieve cybersecurity goals with the 
ScreenLock approach. Control of a login session can be 
transferred without reauthentication if users do not follow 
proper procedures. User training in the use of 
ScreenLock is important. 
CONCLUSION 
The enhanced cybersecurity measures for console 
access described in t h s  paper have been in place in the C- 
AD Main Control Room since late August of this year. 
They provide a greatly enhanced level of individual 
accountability without interfering significantly with the 
efficient use of control room consoles. The same 
approach is planned for other smaller control rooms in the 
C-AD accelerator complex. 
Network restrictions with Linux-PAM are in the process 
of being fully implemented. For a small set of computers, 
direct network access with a group account is still 
necessary to allow management of server processes that 
run under the group account. Alternative mechanisms of 
server process management are being considered. Full 
implementation of network restrictions is expected by the 
end of this year. 
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